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Judicial Recusals
HAROLD S. LEVY*
I. Introduction
With due deference to the weighty issues of professional
ethics which we are gathered here to discuss, I want to share
with you a story about the ethical plight a certain old lawyer
found himself upon his death.
The old lawyer was met at the gates of heaven by Saint Peter.
"Sir," exclaimed St. Peter, "we have been awaiting your arrival.
Follow me. God himself would like to welcome you." The pearly
gates were flung open and the lawyer and St. Peter walked down
a golden roadway to the glittering castle of the Almighty.
"This is indeed a great occasion," said God, "you are most
honored among men."
The lawyer knew all that but thought it appropriate to dis-
play some degree of humility before God. So he asked, "Why am I
so special?"-hoping to hear a more detailed description of his
virtures.
"Why," said God, "you are the oldest human being to come
to us since Methuselah."
"But I was only 82 when I died," said the lawyer.
"That can't be," said St. Peter. "You are 484 years old. We
added up your time sheets."
It is not my purpose here to palaver about the time sheets
prepared by law firms representing large corporate clients, no
matter how appealing that topic may be. Rather, I wish to ad-
dress another way a large corporate client can be "done in" by
someone other than its adversary in a litigation, namely by the
judiciary. I am not speaking about the rendition of adverse deci-
sions on the merits. I refer instead to the refusal by judges to
* J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Harvard University, magna cum laude, Phi Beta
Kappa; Vice-President and General Counsel at New York Telephone and Telegraph
Company.
This piece was originally presented to the ABA-ALI Spring Program on Conflicts in
the Law.
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
render any decision at all as a result of either extraordinarily
strict ethical standards carved into our statutory framework or
of overly broad interpretations of what can fairly be called "non-
mandatory" disqualification circumstances.
The impact of recusals on the large corporation is both ob-
vious and subtle. Obviously, recusals limit the pool of judges
available to hear a case. The stricter the ethical standards the
more recusals and the smaller pool of judges. More subtly, some
recusals affect the type of judge left in the pool. For example,
recusal standards which penalize intelligent investors, or which
are stricter for judges who formerly engaged in private practice
than for judges formerly engaged in government service, may
well eliminate the types of jurists most able to comprehend the
position of the large corporation.
The two principal areas I wish to cover are, first, the
mandatory disqualification situations, focusing on the situation
where the judge has a so-called "financial interest" and, second,
non-mandatory situations, especially where the judge had previ-
ously worked at a law firm which performed occasional or unre-
lated legal work for a corporation now appearing as a party in a
litigation before that judge. In addition, I will attempt to put the
present recusal standards in historical perspective, and in light
of what has gone before, I think you will see that the present
standards regarding judicial recusals have evolved as a Hegelian
dialect; Congress and bar associations have attempted to balance
the right of a litigant to have access to the full judicial system
against the need to preserve fairness and the appearance of fair-
ness, tipping the scales first one way and then the other.
II. Mandatory Recusals
The focus of my remarks will be on the federal judiciary.
Since the federal statute is patterned on the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Judicial Conduct,' which also serves as the ba-
sis for state pronouncements on the subject, certain of my re-
marks may be applicable on the state level as well.
Disqualification of federal judges is governed by 28 U.S.C. §
1. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972) [hereinafter referred to as the ABA
Code].
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455.2 Subsection (a) requires generally that "[a]ny justice, judge,
or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned." s If left to this bare statement, the law might allow con-
siderable flexibility, surely sufficient to permit a judge to sit in
"gray area" cases where the parties knowingly consented to
waive any ethical question. However, the statute does not stop
there. Subsection (b) of § 455 makes disqualification mandatory
where certain broad circumstances are applicable to the judge.4
Of particular concern to the large corporation is the auto-
matic disqualification where the judge possesses some "financial
interest" in the subject matter in issue or in one of the parties.5
Section 455(d)(4) defines financial interest in a fatally preclusive
manner: " '[Flinancial interest' means ownership of a legal or
equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director,
advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a
party.. . ." To the extent this restriction prohibits a judge
from hearing a case where he or a member of his family has a
legal or beneficial interest in so much as a single share of stock
in a widely-held corporation, there will be a great many jurists
who must recuse themselves from any case in which that corpo-
ration is a party. In the case of a company such as American
Telephone & Telegraph, with over 700 million shares outstand-
ing, held by several million shareholders, there is the very real
possibility that the company will be denied access to as full, bal-
anced and representative a range of judges as is available to
other smaller litigants.
Not only can the financial interest stricture result in the
same few judges hearing all of a company's appeals, to either the
advantage or disadvantage of the company, but it can also work
a particular hardship in the "big case," which presents signifi-
2. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. Id. § 455(a) (Supp. III 1979).
4. Id. § 455(b). The 1974 House Committee report on the amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 state that their purpose is to make "the statutory grounds for disqualification of a
judge in a particular case conform generally with the recently adopted canon of the Code
of Judicial Conduct. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (hereinafter cited as
H.R. Rep.], reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1976).
6. Id. § 455(d)(4) (emphasis added).
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cant legal issues or has far-reaching consequences appropriate
for hearing or rehearing en banc. It may well be that en banc
consideration will be effectively denied for no other reason than
that the judges on the original three judge panel are the only
circuit judges not disqualified to hear the case. For example, in
one recent federal appeal, AT&T's motion for rehearing with a
suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied when a majority of
the circuit judges in regular active service did not vote for re-
hearing en banc.7 A note at the bottom of the order disclosed
that six of that circuit's ten judges had recused themselves, leav-
ing the en banc review application to only one judge in addition
to the original panel.
Particularly discouraging is the fact that we are not always
aware of the recusals which take place behind the closed doors
of the courts of appeal and, thus, do not know the full impact of
these strict ethical rules. A circuit court tells you only the three
judge panel you are going to get, but does not normally tell you
the panel you were going to get until Judge X, who had been
scheduled to sit on the panel, recused himself, upon hearing that
a trust, in which his wife had a beneficial interest, held two
shares of AT&T stock.
Of course, strict ethical standards can also serve as an ex-
cuse for a judge to avoid complex and protracted cases. There is
a story told involving an action brought by a Bell Company for
breach of a patent licensing agreement in a state chancery court.
The defendant in that case asserted a vigorous defense which
challenged the validity of AT&T's patents and counterclaimed
on several exotic and intricate antitrust theories. The issues
quickly became much more complicated than the chancery judge
could or wished to handle, and it became increasingly clear with
every court appearance that the judge wanted out. Then one day
the judge appeared in court with a broad smile on his face. He
told the parties he had something important to read into the
record. He announced that he discovered that he owned 100
shares of Western Electric stock. The Bell System lawyers
looked at each other in shock as they were firmly convinced that
AT&T owned fully 100% of the shares of Western Electric, and
7. Essential Communications Syss., Inc. v. American Tel. Co., No. 78-2521 (3d Cir.
Nov. 23, 1979) (order denying rehearing and rehearing en bane).
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had for some time. As gently as possible, the Bell System law-
yers urged the judge to look at his stock certificates. The judge
begrudgingly agreed, but stated that, as far as he was concerned,
he must recuse himself. Unfortunately for that poor chancery
judge, his interest turned out to be in Western Union stock.
Although this particular anecdote involved a state chancery
judge, it would blink reality to ignore blithely the fact that dock-
et congestion, understaffing, and the Speedy Trial Act8 commit-
ments give federal district judges very real incentives to avoid
getting saddled with complex and protracted civil litigation.
Given the severe impact strict judicial ethics rules can have
on the large corporation, one would think there should be some
meaningful exceptions to the rule of disqualification for financial
interest "however small." There is an exception clause to this
"however small" statutory language, which is found in section
455(d)(4), 9 but it does not appear to cover, for example, owner-
ship of stock by a judge or member of his immediate family. Dis-
qualification is the rule, except for these very specific exceptions
enumerated in section 455.10 Under subsection (e) there can be
no waiver of a disqualification based on a financial interest."
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that ignorance of a financial in-
terest could serve as an excuse. Subsection (c) of § 455 forewarns
a judge to "inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform him-
self about the personal financial interests of his spouse and mi-
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1976).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (1976).
10. Id. § 455(d)(4) provides that a judge need not disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not
a "financial interest" in such securities unless the judge participates in the man-
agement of the fund;
(ii) An office in an education, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization
is not a "financial interest" in securities held by the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of
a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a
"financial interest" in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" in the issuer only
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
11. Id. § 455(e) (Supp. III 1979).
1982]
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nor children residing in his household."'"
One can fairly ask the question whether a simple interest in
the stock of a large, publicly-held corporate party should be suf-
ficient to mandate recusal. The Fifth Circuit, in Kinnear-Weed
Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.," held that the judge's
wife's ownership of 100 shares of Humble stock was an "infini-
tesimal" portion of the thirty-six million shares outstanding, and
thus, could not warrant by any stretch of the imagination a find-
ing that this constituted a "financial interest.1 4 Unfortunately,
however, this decision is of little precedential value today since
it was decided in 1968 under a prior statute.
A. Historical Perspective on Recusal Standards
At the time of the 1968 decision in Kinnear-Weed the stat-
ute read in general terms:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has
been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related
to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it
improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or
other proceeding therein.1'
The key differences between the previous and current versions
of section 455 are obvious. The prior statute required the finding
of a "substantial" interest whereas the current version mandates
disqualification if there is a financial interest "however small."
Further, the prior statute, through the phrase "in his opinion,"
left the ultimate disqualification decision to the subjective deter-
mination of the judge, whereas the current version attempts to
set up a more objective standard.
In reporting in 1974 on the amended language, which was
12. Id. § 455(c) (1976).
13. 403 F.2d 437, 440, reh'g denied, 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
14. Id. at 440. But cf. United States v. U.S. Steel, No. 79-709 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22,
1982), discussed in Nat'l L.J., March 8, 1982, at 9, col. 2 (where Judge Maurice B. Cohill,
Jr., a Marathon Oil Co. shareholder, in administering a consent decree involving U.S.
Steel Co., recused himself because U.S. Steel's recent takeover of Marathon Oil made
him a U.S. Steel shareholder).
15. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) (current version of 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 2:35
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enacted as the current section 455, the House Committee on the
Judiciary specifically addressed the question of stock ownership
by a judge.1 6 While the report made clear that the amendments
were designed to end subjective speculation which had arisen
under the former statute, debate still exists. The report stated:
Questions were inevitably raised as to whether 100 shares of
1,000,000 outstanding shares in a party corporation was "substan-
tial," whether the $1,000 value of such shares out of the judge's
total investments of $400,000 was "substantial;" or whether sub-
stantiality must be judged in the light of the particular party's
financial situation. Moreover, the statute made the judge himself
the sole decider of the substantiality of interest or of the relation-
ships which would be improper and lead to disqualification.17
The report's bottom line statement on the stock ownership ques-
tion was most remarkable: "A judge is free to invest. He should
invest in companies which are not likely to become litigants in
his court. If that should happen, then he must disqualify
himself."18
This statement appears to be either disingenuous or naive;
whichever its character, it makes no sense in the real world. How
can a judge anywhere in the federal court system be "free to
invest" in the largest corporations of America when those com-
panies are repeatedly present in every circuit, if not district, in
the country? Contrary to the committee report's language, strict
application of this statute means that a judge or his family is
definitely not free to invest in any of the so-called "blue chip"
securities that are traditionally considered among the best in-
vestments. If he cannot invest in his local companies and he can-
not invest in national companies, in what can he invest? I sup-
pose real estate on the other side of the country is a possibility.
This and other similar quality investments appear to remain the
only alternatives open to the judiciary.
One thing that does appear clear from the committee report
is that both the judge's right to invest and the corporation's
right to access to the full judicial system have been subordinated
to the establishment of a Procrustean disqualification test. The
16. H.R. REP., supra note 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351.
17. Id. at 6352.
18. Id. at 6357.
1982]
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committee report states:
Under subsection (d)(4), a financial interest is defined as any
legal or equitable interest, "however small." Thus, uncertainty
and ambiguity about what is a "substantial" interest is avoided.
Moreover, decisions of the Supreme Court.. . support the pro-
position that the judge's direct economic or financial interest,
even though relatively small, in the outcome of the case, may well
be inconsistent with due process.1 '
The Supreme Court cases are not dispositive of the stock
ownership question from an intellectual point of view. Tumey v.
Ohio20 stands for the proposition that a defendant in a criminal
case involving his liberty or property cannot be tried before a
judge having a direct, personal, or substantial interest in con-
victing him. That case involved an Ohio law under which the
judge did not receive any fee for his services unless he found a
defendant guilty. On less blatant facts, the rule is not quite as
strong as the House Committee apparently believed, even in
criminal cases like Tumey. For example, one case holds that a
judge need not disqualify himself from the trial of an accused
bank robber where the judge owns stock in the bank which was
robbed. 1 Indeed, a judge need not disqualify himself even
where, in addition to a stock interest held by a judge and his
family, the judge's brother was chairman of the board of direc-
tors and chief executive officer of the robbed bank and its hold-
ing company.22 The Commonwealth Coatings23 case involved in-
terpretation of the United States Arbitration Act2 4 as requiring
an arbitrator to disclose that he was an occasional engineering
consultant for one of the parties to the arbitration.
In the history of judicial recusals, statutory provisions have
only temporarily "settled" the issue, and sometimes have not
19. Id. at 6356 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court decisions referred to in the
quotation are: Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); and Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
20. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
21. United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
834 (1970).
22. United States v. Sellers, 566 F.2d 884, 886-87 (4th Cir. 1977).
23. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968),
reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
[Vol. 2:35
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"settled" anything at all. Prior to the approval of the present
ABA Code in August, 1972, and the conforming statutory
amendments of 1974, the prior statute involved in Kinnear-
Weed had left disqualification to the subjective judgment of the
judge.2 5 The proper exercise of a judge's discretion was clouded,
however, by a somewhat different standard in force among bar
associations. Canon Thirteen of the old Canons of Judicial Eth-
ics provided that "a judge should not act in a controversy where
a near relative is a party."'2 6 Canon Twenty-nine provided that
"a judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any
judicial act in which his personal interests are involved.'2 7 The
1974 House Committee report noted the problems created by
the differing statutory and professional standards.2
The method adopted to solve the problem for the judge was
not limited to creating a uniform standard. It also involved re-
ducing his discretion. This reduction works to the detriment of a
large corporate party's right of access to the judicial system.
It is interesting to note, however, that this is not the first
time there has been an attempt to establish an "objective" test.
The "subjective" test established by the prior version of section
455 had been in effect only since 1948. The initial version of sec-
tion 455, adopted in 1911, reads as follows:
Whenever it appears that the judge of any district court is in any
25. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). See supra text accompanying note 15.
26. CANONS OF JuticuL ETmcs Canon 13 (1937) (amended 1972), see supra note 1.
27. Id. at Canon 29.
28. H.R. RaP., supra note 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6352.
These statutory and ethical provisions proved to be not only indefinite and
ambiguous, but also, in certain situations, conflicting. The uncertainty of who was
a "near relative" or of when the judge was "so related" caused problems in appli-
cation of both the statutory and the ethical standards. While the Canon required
disqualification for involvement of "his personal interest," the statute required
such action only when it was "a substantial interest...."
The existence of dual standards, statutory and ethical, couched in uncertain
language has had the effect of forcing a judge to decide either the legal issue or the
ethical issue at his peril. He was occasionally subjected to a criticism by others
who necessarily had the benefit of hind sight. The effect of the existing situation is
not only to place the judge on the horns of a dilemma but, in some circumstances,
to weaken public confidence in the judicial system.
1982]
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way concerned in interest in any suit pending therein, or has
been of counsel or is a material witness for either party, or is so
related to or connected with either party as to render it improper,
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, it shall be his duty, on
application by either party, to cause the fact to be entered on the
records of the court; and also an order that an authenticated copy
thereof shall be forthwith certified to the senior circuit judge for
said circuit then present in the circuit; and thereupon such pro-
ceedings shall be had as are provided in section fourteen."
To be sure, the "in any way concerned in interest" language
had been considerably more strict than the "substantial inter-
est" test of the 1948 revision. This is a conclusion shared by the
Fifth Circuit, which in Kinnear-Weed declined to follow cases
under the 1911 version that ordered disqualification on the basis
of small stock interests in publicly held companies.80 Thus, to-
day we see a return to that "old time religion" and a rejection of
the reformations of 1948.
III. Non-mandatory Recusals
In light of the express congressional intent to replace the
"subjective" test with a strict, objective one, and in light of the
commanding tone of section 455(a) that a judge "shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned,"3 1 there may be some doubt whether
there is such a thing as non-mandatory disqualification. Obvi-
ously, there must be some flexibility to deal with the inevitable
"gray area."
In the first place, in cases other than those falling within the
specific proscriptions of subsection (b),s ' there is much room for
interpretation in considering when a judge's "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." In the second place, section 455 rec-
ognizes that some conflicts are not so substantial as to require
automatic disqualification, but can be waived by the parties to
29. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
455 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) (emphasis added).
30. Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 440. One of the earlier
cases referred to is In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1917), which
applied the test of "in any way concerned in interest."
31. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 455(b) (1976).
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the litigation:
No justice, judge, or magistate shall accept from the parties to the
proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumer-
ated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification
arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided
it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification."'
One area that is not fully addressed by the statute is where
one of the parties to the litigation had been and perhaps still is
represented by the judge's former firm. Section 455 is clear that
a judge must recuse himself if he or "a lawyer with whom he
previously practiced" rendered legal services in connection with
the specific matter in controversy or had been a material witness
concerning it. 3 4 The statute, however, is silent on the other pos-
sibilities, such as the infinite variety of situations involving the
judge himself or one of his former colleagues having represented
one of the parties in connection with unrelated matters.
In considering these possibilities, consider also the distinc-
tion the statute draws between a judge who in his former life
practiced with a law firm and one who had practiced with a gov-
ernment agency. Under section 455(b)(2) a judge is automati-
cally disqualified if his law partner rendered legal services in
connection with the pending matter." But under subsection
(b)(3), a judge who had been in prior government service need
not disqualify himself where an associate participated as coun-
sel, advisor, or material witness in the matter in controversy.36
This distinction also can be found in the ABA Code, but there,
unlike the statute, a commentary states that a judge "should
disqualify himself in a proceeding if his impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned because of such association."3 7
This differing treatment of private practice and government
service, despite the fact that the information flow between law-
yers in government service and in law firms must be presumed
to be the same, calls into question whether there really are, or
33. Id. § 455(e) (Supp. III 1979).
34. Id. § 455(b)(2) (1976).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 455(b)(3).
37. ABA CODE OF JUDICM CONDUCT Canon 3, comment (c)(1)(b) (1972).
19821
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can be, any black and white rules in this area, or whether fair
standards must not be more flexible and geared to a case by case
approach. It may also be the case that this area of judicial
recusals, where a party was or is represented by the judge's old
firm, converges with the law on conflicts of interest generally. A
possible test would be whether the representation of the party
by the judge's old firm was of a nature that confidences relevant
to the matter in controversy could have been imparted to the
firm and, thus, inferentially at least, to the judge.
Most important to all the "non-mandatory" recusal situa-
tions, be it the prior representation situation or some other, is
that a judge must carefully weigh his conflict with a correspond-
ing implied duty to perform his function and hear a case. If the
parties to a litigation are willing to waive recusal, they should be
allowed to do so, and we should not countenance a situation
where a judge acts unilaterally to his calendar, or to avoid what
may appear to be a protracted or complicated litigation.
IV. Conclusion
Ethical codes are of course essential to our judiciary's
proper functioning and to the right of parties to a hearing before
an impartial tribunal. Care must be taken, however, to fashion
these codes so that the right of access to the courts is not im-
paired. The right to be heard is one of the most fundamental
requisites of due process.u This latter right should not be so
strictly construed as to be satisfied if there is a judge available,
but should be construed to prevent one class of litigants, such as
large corporations, from being deprived of access to large num-
bers of jurists who may be best qualified to hear their cases.
38. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962).
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